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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










CHRISTOPHER GEOFF LAINE, 
         Appellant 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 05-cr-00193-14) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 9, 2010 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 








  Appellant Christopher Laine pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; conspiracy to import controlled 
substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; conspiracy to introduce misbranded drugs 
into commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 21 U.S.C. § 331(a); conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and promotional money 
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laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  In the plea agreement, Laine 
agreed that, with very limited exceptions, he would not appeal or present any collateral 
challenge to his conviction or sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, or any other provision of law.  On February 2, 2007, the District Court, on 
the government’s motion, departed from the advisory Guideline range of 41-51 months, 
and imposed on Laine a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three 
years of supervised release. 
  After serving his sentence, and two of the three years of his term of 
supervised release, Laine filed a motion to terminate supervised release pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e).1  In it he alleged that he had fully complied with the terms of his 
supervised release and there was no reason to further supervise him.  Furthermore, he had 
recently been ordained a priest, and he wanted to set up a monastery in fourteen western 
states with a mission to provide and care for children and women.  Toward that effort, he 
would need to travel around the United States and Canada to raise funds and public 
awareness.  After the government submitted a letter to the District Court indicating it did 
not oppose termination, the District Court nevertheless denied Laine’s motion.  The court 
reasoned that Laine had committed extremely serious crimes, and a three-year term of 
supervised release was not inappropriate under those circumstances. 2  Moreover, there 
 
1 Section 3583(e) of title 18 authorizes the sentencing court to terminate a term of 
supervised release prior to its expiration.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 n.3 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 458 (U.S. 2009) (citing United States v. Lussier, 104 
F.3d 32, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1997)).  The defendant must have served one year of supervised 
release and the sentencing court must determine that “such action is warranted by the 
conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  
2 Section 3583(e)(1) directs the sentencing court to consider the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), which are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
defendant’s history and characteristics;  (2) the need to afford  adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide 
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was nothing exceptional or unusual about Laine’s having been compliant with the terms 
of his supervised release.  The District Court noted that the United States Probation 
Office could certainly continue to supervise Laine without interfering with his plan to 
establish a monastery. 
Laine appeals.  Our Clerk advised him that his appeal was subject to 
summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to 
submit argument in writing, and he has done so.  We have reviewed and considered his 
submissions.  Laine also has filed a motion for appointment of counsel on appeal and a 
motion to compel the production of certain probation records.  The government has 
moved to enforce the appellate waiver Laine agreed to when he pleaded guilty. 
We will grant the government’s motion to enforce the appellate waiver and 
summarily affirm.  Initially, we conclude that Laine knowingly and voluntarily agreed to 
the appellate waiver provision in the plea agreement.  A waiver is enforceable if it was 
knowing and voluntary, and enforcing the waiver would not work a miscarriage of 
justice.  See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2008) (waiver is valid if 
knowing and voluntary and enforcement does not result in a miscarriage of justice), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2789 (U.S. 2009); United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (court will not exercise jurisdiction if waiver is knowing and voluntary and 
does not result in a miscarriage of justice); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562-
63 (3d Cir. 2001) (waiver should be strictly construed if knowing and voluntary and not a 
                                                                                                                                                 
him with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range 
established for the defendant’s crimes; (4) pertinent policy statements issued by the 
United States Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(D) & (4)-(7). 
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miscarriage of justice).  At the guilty plea colloquy, the District Court reviewed the 
appellate waiver provision with Laine, and Laine indicated that he understood that he was 
waiving his appellate rights.  See N.T., 3/6/06, at 15-16.  Laine does not contend that the 
District Court did not adequately explain the waiver to him.  Cf. Fed. R. Crim. Pro.  
11(b)(1) (“court must address the defendant personally” and “must inform the defendant 
of, and determine that the defendant understands *** (N) the terms of any plea-agreement 
provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence”). 
We further conclude that our decision in United States v. Goodson, 544 
F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 2008), applies in Laine’s case, and it requires us to enforce the waiver.  
Laine’s motion is at its core one to shorten the sentence originally imposed.  In Goodson, 
we held that an identical waiver provision encompassed the defendant’s right to appeal a 
special condition of his supervised release, reasoning that both “the duration, as well as 
the conditions of supervised release are components of a sentence.”  Id. at 538 (emphasis 
added).  By waiving his right to a direct appeal, the defendant in Goodson waived his 
right to challenge the conditions of his supervised release.  See id.  Similarly, by waiving 
his right to a direct appeal, Laine waived his right to challenge the duration of his term of 
supervised release. 
None of the narrow exceptions to the waiver applies in Laine’s case.   
Moreover, we do not believe that enforcing the waiver will work a miscarriage of justice 
in Laine’s case.  In Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562-63, we held that an appellate waiver should 
be strictly construed if knowing and voluntary and not a miscarriage of justice.  In 
determining whether the defendant should be relieved of the waiver, we consider the 
“clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a 
sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, 
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the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the 
defendant acquiesced in the result.”  Id. at 563 (citing United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 
14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
Laine’s circumstances do not suggest a miscarriage of justice.  He pleaded 
guilty and admitted the charges, and the sentence imposed was well below the advisory 
Guidelines range.  Generally, the sentencing judge’s discretion to monitor a defendant’s 
supervised release is broad, cf. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007) (“The 
sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the 
individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court.”), and early 
termination of supervised release under section 3583(e) should occur only when the 
sentencing judge is satisfied that something exceptional or extraordinary warrants it, see 
Lussier, 104 F.3d at 36.  Simple compliance with the conditions of supervised release are 
expected and not exceptional, and Laine’s plan to open a monastery to serve victims of 
domestic violence, and to travel the United States and Canada to raise money and public 
awareness, does not mean that his continuation on supervised release for another year is a 
miscarriage of justice.  Last, because we are enforcing the waiver, we will not consider 
Laine’s argument that the District Court erred by rendering its decision without first 
seeking input from the Probation Office.  
  For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the government’s motion, enforce 
the appellate waiver, and summarily affirm.  Laine’s motion for appointment of counsel 
on appeal and motion to compel are denied. 
